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MEMORYRANGER PREVENTS HIJACKING
FILE OBJECT STRUCTURES IN WINDOWS
KERNEL
Igor Korkin, PhD
Security Researcher
Moscow, Russia
igor.korkin@gmail.com

ABSTRACT
Windows OS kernel memory is one of the main targets of cyber-attacks. By launching such
attacks, hackers are succeeding in process privilege escalation and tampering with users' data by
accessing kernel-mode memory. This paper considers a new example of such an attack, which
results in access to the files opened in an exclusive mode. Windows built-in security features
prevent such legal access, but attackers can circumvent them by patching dynamically allocated
objects. The research shows that the Windows 10, version 1809 x64 is vulnerable to this attack.
The paper provides an example of using MemoryRanger, a hypervisor-based solution to prevent
such attack by running kernel-mode drivers in isolated kernel memory enclaves.
Keywords: attacks on files, hypervisor-based protection, memory isolation, exclusively opened
file.

1. INTRODUCTION
Modern preemptive multitasking operating
systems like Windows and UNIX-based systems
have two modes of operation: user mode and
kernel mode. These modes are supported by
CPUs and make it possible to isolate code and
memory data in these two modes.
Apart from OS kernel and drivers, kernelmode memory includes a lot of sensitive data
structures, which can be used by attackers.
CPUs do not provide any security features to
prevent illegal access to that memory. As a
result, intruders can gain read- and writeaccess to the kernel-mode memory by installing
malware drivers or by exploiting driver
vulnerabilities.
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To mitigate these threats Windows has
issued
several
protection
mechanisms:
PatchGuard, Device Guard etc. but they
protect only fixed memory regions. For
example, PatchGuard detects the Microsoft
drivers hijacking (Unknowncheats, 2019). These
security features do not completely prevent
access to the dynamically allocated data
structures.
For example, by exploiting Microsoft CVE2018-8120 (Rapid7, 2018-a) vulnerability an
attacker "could run arbitrary code in kernel
mode".
By
using
recently
published
vulnerabilities CVE-2018-8611 (Rapid7, 2018-b)
and CVE-2018-8170 (Rapid7, 2018-c) attackers
can elevate process privileges even on the
newest Windows 10.
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Newest APT such as FruityArmor and
SandCat applies zero-day vulnerabilities of
Windows OS kernel components, such as
Win32k.sys to elevate process privileges: CVE2018-8453, CVE-2018-8589, CVE-2019-0797.
During these attacks, intruders patch the fields
of EPROCESS structure, which corresponds to
the particular process.
This paper considers a new kernel-mode
memory attack on FILE_ OBJECT structures,
which makes it possible to read and write the
content of the files opened by drivers in an
exclusive mode. As a result, attackers can
illegally access opened local and network files,
which were not permitted for sharing.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as
follows.
Section 2 provides the details of this attack
and shows that security features from Windows
10 do not prevent it.
Section 3 contains the details of adapting
MemoryRanger to prevent this attack and
demonstrates that this solution successfully
prevents this attack.
Section 4 and Section 5 focus on the main
conclusions and further research directions
respectively.

2.HLJACKING
FILE OBJECT TO GET
AN ACCESS TO THE
FILE OPENED IN
EXCLUSIVE MODE
This section describes the internals of filesystem
routines in the kernel mode with and without
sharing access. The details of how to gain a full
access to the file opened in an exclusive mode
will be given in the second part of this chapter.

2.1 Overview of File System. Kernelmode Routines
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Windows drivers call the following routines
during file operations:

•
•
•

ZwCreateFile - to create (or open) a
file;
ZwReadFile/ ZwWriteFile - to read and
write the file content;
ZwClose - to close the file handle and
release system resources.

The detailed overview of all the parameters
for the functions are in MSDN (2017). All the
steps for creating a file and getting the file
handle are presented by Tanenbaum (2015).
The first function ZwCreateFile takes the
full file name, flags etc. and returns a handle to
a successfully opened file or otherwise it returns
error status. During this operation, the I/ O
manager calls the Object Manager to look up
the named file and to help it resolve any
symbolic links to the file object (Easefilter,
n.d.).
Object Manager calls Security Reference
Monitor (SRM) to process security checks, see
Figure 1.
According
to
Y osifovich,
Ionescu,
Russinovich,
& Solomon
(2017)
SRM
determines "whether a file's Access Control List
(ACL) allows to access the file in the way its
thread is requesting. If it does, the object
manager grants the access and associates the
granted access rights with the file handle that
it
returns".
I/ O
Manager
builds
FILE OBJECTS with the help from the
Object Manager (Russinovich, 1997; Nagar,
1997-a). The handle is used in read and write
operations as well as to close the file. The
FILE OBJECT structure is an internal OS
structure, which plays the role of kernel
equivalent of a handle. As a result, each opened
file has two structures in memory: a handle and
a FILE_ 0 EJECT, see Figure 1.
The functions ZwReadFile\ ZwWriteFile
take the handle obtained at the previous step
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to read and write the files content. According
to the Fernandez E. B. and Sinibaldi J.C.
(2003) during these operations, SRM is not
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involved, see Figure 1, and this vulnerability
can be used by attackers.

Driver A

ZwReadFile(( File Handle))
ZwWriteFile(( File Handle))
ZwClose(( File Handle))

IZwCreateFile( SecurityEvents.log I
SecurityEvents.log

( File Handle )
I/O Manager
SecurityEvents.log

I

( File Handle )

ObjectManager

r--

cteate

allocate

check

1

Security Reference Monitor

File Handle

)

~

(

7. FILE_OBJECT
t

IFile System DriversDl

D-D-0-{]
Access Control List (ACL)

J

I

HDD

t

I SecurityEvents.log '1

Figure 1. Internals of File System Routines in Windows Kernel

Finally, the ZwClose routine takes a handle
to finish all writing operations and close an
opened file. During this operation, SRM is not
involved either.

2.2 W-mdows built-in sectnity

sharing
ZwCreateFile has a ShareAccess flag. This flag
determines how the file is currently opened and
also determines types of access allowed to
proceed or deny with an error code of
STATUS SHARING VIOLATION
(Nagar,
1997-a).
Let us focus on the following scenario, see
Figure 2. Driver A calls ZwCreateFile without
sharing permission or with flag ShareAccess
equals NULL. Object Manager successfully
allocates FILE OBJECT. Next the attacker's
Driver calls the ZwCreateFile in order to gain a
legal access to the file, which is already opened
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in an exclusive mode by DriverA. Object
Manager
returns
the
error
status
STATUS SHARING VIOLATION to the
attacker's Driver and prevents access to the
file. As a result , the attacker fails to open such
a file.
The present research reveals a vulnerability
m File System Routines. The thing is that
Object Manager addresses SRM only during
ZwCreateFile call. Object Manager does not
process any security checks during ZwReadFile
and ZwWriteFile calls.

2.3 Analysis of FILE_ OBJECT
strncture
Let us have a look at the details of
FILE OBJECT structure. As it was mentioned
before, this structure is created by I/ O
Manager when a driver opens a file handle.
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FILE OBJECT structure includes about
30 fields , the detailed overview of all these files
are presented by (McHoes, & Flynn, 2013) and
(Nagar, 1997-b).
FILE OBJECT fields partially duplicates
the flags , which have been used during calling
ZwCreateFile. For example, for the file opened
by ZwCreateFile routine with flag ShareAccess,
which equals NULL, the corresponding
FILE OBJECT structure has zero fields
SharedRead and SharedWrite. The processed
research shows that setting SharedRead and
SharedWrite fields in the FILE OBJECT does
not allow the shared access to this file. The
information about files sharing permission is
also collected by SRM in the ACLs.

The Console for Driver A
Driver A
ZwCreateFile SecurityEvents.log
+ exclusive mode
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The following four FILE_ OBJECT fields
are used during read and write operations:

•
•
•
•

Vpb;
FsContext;
FsContext2;
SectionObjectPointer.

The Vpb field is initialized by the I/ O
Manager before sending a create or an open
request to the file system driver. The Vpb field
points to a mounted Volume Parameter Block
(VPB), associated with the target device
object.

The Console for the Attacker s Driver
The Attacker s Driver
.
ZwCreateFile SecurityEvents.log

!t
)

Sharing
Violation

I/O manager, ObjectManager, Security Reference Monitor, File Drivers

(····························=
FILE_OBJECT

FILE_OBJECT

....-························t,_____________________________ /:

--------··

SecurityEvents.log
Figure 2. Windows OS prevents an illegal access attempt via calling ZwCreateFile to the file opened without sharing
permissions

According to Nagar (1997-a) the FsContext ,
FsContext2 , and SectionObjectPointer fields
are initialized and maintained by the file
system drivers and the NT Cache Manager.

SectionObjectPointer refers to a structure
of type SECTION_ OBJECT_ POINTERS and
and
caching-related
file-mapping
stores
information for a file stream.

FsContext
points
to
the
FSRTL COMMON FCB HEADER
structure, which has to be allocated by the file
system or network driver.

These four fields are used in read and write
files operations , which are processed without
involving SRM and checking shared permission.

FsContext2 field refers to the Context
Control Block (CBB) associated with the file
object.
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The key feature is that attackers can read
these fields without any issues and use them to
gain an access to the opened file. The details of
this hijacked attack are below.
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2.4 Accessing the content of the file
opened in an exclusive mooe by
hijacking its FILE_OBJECT
Let us move on to the considered scenario,
see
Figure 3. The attacker's driver hijacks the target
FILE_ 0 BJECT structure to gain an illegal access to the
file opened without sharing permission

. In a similar way, DriverA has opened a target
file in an exclusive mode. Object Manager
successfully allocated the FILE OBJECT
structure to handle this file.
As it was mentioned before, the legal access
to this file is blocked and the malware driver
processes the following steps to gain the access
illegally:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Calls ZwCreateFile routine to create a
new
file , e.g.
with
the
name
"hijacker.txt".
Calls ObReferenceObjectByHandle to
get
a
pointer
to
the
created
FILE_ OBJECT for the file hijacker.txt.
Finds FILE OBJECT structure for the
target file using the file name and walk
through the Object Directory list
(Probert, 2004; Pistelli, n.d.; Silberman,
2006; Microsoft. n.d.; GamingMasteR,
2009; Korkin & Nesterow, 2016; Fyyre,
2018; Abdalhalim, 2018).
Copies the following four fields from
FILE_ OBJECT for the target_ file to
the FILE OBJECT for the file
hijacker. txt:
• Vpb;
• FsContext;
• FsContext2;
• SectionObjectPointer.
Calls ZwReadFile/ ZwWriteFile with the
opened handle for the hijack_ file to
read and write the content of the
target _ file.
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After processing these five steps, malware
driver has achieved a full read and write access
to the target file.
These manipulations were successfully
tested on Windows 10, version 1809 x64. After
waiting 10 hours, nothing happened, like
appearing BSOD from PatchGuard, which is
designed
to
prevent
illegal
memory
modifications .
The experimental results show that a
malware driver can gain full access to the
opened file without sharing permission by
hijacking its FILE_ OBJECT and PatchGuard
does not prevent this invasion.
The presented kernel attack is applicable to
all modern Windows OSes since Windows NT
4.0. Windows components Object Manager and
Security Reference Monitor involved in that
attack, were first mentioned by Feldman
( 1993). And the first memory protection
concept was developed in Multics system GE
mainframe in 1965 by Corbat6 & Vyssotsky
(1965).
To protect files content from being stolen
and
guarantee
trusted
computing
the
MemoryRanger hypervisor could be applied.
The steps of adapting MemoryRanger to
prevent this attack are in the next section.
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The Console for Driver A
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The Console for the Attacker s Driver
The Attacker s Driver
ZwCreateFile hijacker.txt

Driver A
ZwCreateFile SecurityEvents.log
+ exclusive mode

I/O manager, ObjectManager, Security Reference Monitor, File Drivers
FILE_OBJECT
for the SecurityEvents.log

copy fields

SecurityEvents.log

FILE_OBJECT
for the hijacker.txt
hijacker.txt

The attacker s driver can get the full access to the file
SecurityEvents.log by copying its FILE_OBJECT
fields to the created FILE_OBJECT for the hijacker.txt
Figure 3. The attacker's driver hijacks the target FILE_ OBJECT structure to gain an illegal access to the file opened
without sharing permission

3. JVlEMORYRANGER
PREVENTS
FILE OBJECT
HLJACKING VIA
JVlEMORY ISOLATION
MemoryRanger is an open-source solution
designed to protect kernel-mode memory by
creating isolated kernel enclaves and running
drivers
inside
them
(Korkin,
2018-a).
MemoryRanger has flexible architecture , which
makes it possible to extend it for the
protection of new memory regions without any
issues.
This chapter includes brief overview of
main components of MemoryRanger and steps
for adapting them to prevent FILE_ OBJECT
hijacking attack.

3.1 Mern.ocyR.anger architecture
MemoryRanger is a hypervisor-based solution
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and includes the following components, see
Figure 4:

•
•
•
•

A kernel-mode driver;
DdiMon;
MemoryMonRWX;
Memory Access Policy (MAP) .

The kernel-mode driver registers driversupplied
callback
routines
that
are
subsequently notified about various OS events,
for example, about loading a new driver.
The next two components DdiMon and
MemoryMonRWX leverage hypervisor facilities
and use VT-x technology with Extended Page
Tables (EPT) mechanism, provided by Intel
CPU.
DdiMon is designed to monitor device
driver interfaces and is able to hook kernelmode API calls transparently for the OS.
MemoryMonRWX is able to track and trap
all types of memory access: read, write, and
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execute.
Memory Access Policy (MAP) plays a role
of an intermediary during memory access to
the protected data and decides whether to
block or allow access.
Initially MemoryRanger allocates the
default EPT structure and puts all loaded
drivers and kernel inside it. MemoryRanger
traps loading of a new driver, then
MemoryRanger allocates and configures a new
EPT structure so that only this new driver and
OS kernel are executed here. MemoryRanger

OS

A new driver
is loaded

Memory
Ranger

Driver receives
OS events
notifications

CDFSL Proceedings 2019

isolates execution of drivers by switching
between EPTs.
MemoryRanger hooks kernel API calls. The
current version of MemoryRanger hooks
ExAllocatePoolWithTag function
to the
protected newly allocated memory. Each time
an
isolated
driver
allocates
memory,
MemoryRanger updates all EPTs: the
allocated memory buffer is accessible only for
this driver, while all other EPTs exclude this
memory. MemoryRanger skips the legal
memory access attempts and prevents the
illegal ones.

Kernel API
function is called

Access to the protect memory
triggers EPT violation

DdiMon hooks
kernel API routines

MemoryMonRWX
traps EPT violations

Hypervisor
PROTECTED_MEMORY

ISOLATED_MEM_ENCLAVE
ISOLATED_MEM_ENCLAVE
ISOLATED_MEM_ENCLAVE

?

PROTECTED_MEMORY

PROTECTED_MEMORY

Memory Access Policy (MAP)
Figure

4.

MemoryRanger architecture

3.2 Adapting MemocyR.anger to
protect FILE_ OBJECT
strnctures
To add a FILE OBJECT support m
MemoryRanger the modification of following
components has been involved:

•
•

DdiMon;
MAP component.

The updated DdiMon hooks two file
system-related routines ZwCreateFile() and
ZwClose().
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ZwCreateFile-callback routine processes the
following:
Calls the original ZwCreateFile routine
and checks whether the returned status
is successful.
2. Checks whether the file has been
created without sharing permission.
3. Checks whether the return address
belongs to the protected drivers.
4. Gets the pointer to the allocated
FILE O EJECT
by
calling
0 bReferenceO bjectByHandle.
1.
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5. Adds the FILE OBJECT pointer and
its size, which equals 0xB bytes to the
protected memory region.

FILE_ OBJECT structure in a similar way to
the existing algorithm for processing access to
the allocated memory pools.

ZwClose()-callback routine processes the
following:

The experimental results demonstrate that
updated MemoryRanger has successfully
protected FILE O EJECT structures by
preventing its hijacking without blocking legal
access to FILE_ OBJECT, see Figure 5. The
source code of updated MemoryRanger and
video demonstrations are here (Korkin, 2018b).

1. Checks whether the return address
belongs to the protected drivers.
2. Gets the pointer to the allocated
FILE O EJECT
by
calling
ObReferenceObjectByHandle.
3. Deletes the FILE OBJECT pointer
and its size, which equals 0xB-bytes
from the list of the protected memory
region.

The processing experiments on Windows 10
x64 have shown that developed updated
MemoryRanger causes acceptable performance
degradation.

The MAP component algorithm processes
access
violation
due
to
access
to
Default Enclave

Enclave for Driver A

Enclave for the Attacker s Driver

OS: NTOS, ObjectManager etc

OS: NTOS, ObjectManager etc

OS: NTOS, ObjectManager etc

'h

'h

....................................
.
.
Driver A
ZwCreateFile
(no sharing)
t..

a. . . . . . . . . . . :

.................................
.
.
Attacker s
Driver
ZwCreateFile
i. ......................

a. :

1-----------------1
1-----------------1
Attacker s
Driver A

Driver A
ZwCreateFile
(no sharing)

Driver
ZwCreateFile
t..........................

a. :

ZwCreateFile
(no sharing)
t-a-------------J

Attacker s
Driver
ZwCreateFile

Access
prevention

.:····.............................................. .
l.. _a ·---------------- _
_.} ________________.
...
.
.
a.:
FILE_OBJECT
for the
SecurityEvents.log

\

..
l

FILE_OBJECT
for the
hijack.txt
t. ______________

..: a ____________________.:_..: -~-FILE_OBJECT ',
for the
t. __SecurityEvents.log
,,

FILE_OBJECT
for the
SecurityEvents.log

..

FILE_OBJECT..\
for the
hijack.txt

FILE_OBJECT
for the
hijack.txt

t·-------------a·.:

MemoryRanger switches
between enclaves so that the code
continues its execution

MemoryRanger

Figure 5. Memory Ranger prevents FILE_ OBJECT hijacking by
running drives into isolated kernel-mode memory enclaves

4. CONCLUSIONS
In summary:
1.

Recently
published
kernel-mode
exploits highlight the fact
that
dynamically allocated data structures
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in Windows OS kernel are becoming
vulnerable.
2. The
analyzed
attack
on
FILE OBJECT
shows
that
the
content of exclusively opened file can
be tampered with.
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3. The
proposed
update
for
MemoryRanger shows how to prevent
hijacking attacks on FILE OBJECT
structures in kernel-mode memory.

5. FUTURE PLANS
5.1 Prevent

~

Privilege
Escalation

analysis
kernel-mode
The
of
recent
vulnerabilities,
such
as
CVE-2018-8120
(Rapid7, 2018-a), CVE-2018-8611 (Rapid7,
2018-b) and CVE-2018-8170 (Rapid7, 2018-c)
shows that typically, vulnerable drivers do not
access EPROCESS structures, but after
exploitation, they tamper with process
structures. For example, during CVE-20188120 exploitation Win32k.sys driver directly
accesses EPROCESS fields, but usually this
driver does not communicate with this
structure.
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2006; The NT Insider 1999; Govindavajhala &
Appel, 2006; MSDN, 2018; Russinovich,
Ionescu & Solomon, 2012).
It seems promising to analyze the
possibility of attacks on the ACL in order to
deliberately change access mask and gain
access to the target object.
MemoryRanger could be applied to provide
the integrity of ACL and prevent these attacks
in general.

The current version of MemoryRanger
traps the loading only of new drivers, moves
only
those
to
isolated
enclosures.
MemoryRanger skips already loaded drivers.
MemoryRanger is able to prevent this
attack by deliberately running all loaded
drivers in separate enclaves.

5.2 Protect ACL \DCL From Being
Patched
Information about objects access rights is
collected in the Access Control List (ACL).
During ZwCreateFile routine call,
the
ObjectManager asks about required permission
from Security Reference Monitor, which walks
through the ACL to check the permissions.
ACL includes access control entries (ACEs),
which indicate what rights are granted to the
object (Hewardt & Pravat, 2008; Swift,
Brundrett , Dyke, Garg, Hopkins, Chan,
Goertzel, & Jensenworth, 2002; Bosworth &
Kabay, 2002; Datta, 2012; The NT Insider,
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